ENFORCING ENVIRONMENTAL
INDEMNIFICATION AGAINST A SETTLING
PARTY UNDER CERCLA
Daniel R. Avery *
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION:

ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP LIABILITY:
THE "WILD CARD" OF A TRANSACTIONAL COST-BENEFIT

873

A NALYSIS ..............................................

II. THE CERCLA ENVIRONMENT: NEW RULES TO FURTHER

III.

SOCIAL POLICY .......................................
ALLOCATION BY PRPs OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR
LIABILITY . ............................................

876
CERCLA
878

A. The Majority Rule: PRPs May Contractually
Allocate CERCLA Responsibility Among

T hem selves ......................................
B. The Minority Rule: PRPs May Transfer CERCLA
Responsibility, But Not to Any Other PRP .......
IV. How MUCH Is ENOUGH? THE LEVEL OF DETAIL
NEEDED TO ALLOCATE CERCLA RESPONSIBILITY ......
A. "As Is" Clauses ..................................
B. All-Inclusive Language ...........................
C. Specified Non-CERCLA Liability .................
V. ENFORCING ENVIRONMENTAL INDEMNITY AGAINST A
SETrLING

VI.

PRP ........................................

878
880
882
882
883
884

885

A. The Statutory Settlement Structure ..............
B. Why PRPs Are Entitled Under CERCLA to Pursue
Environmental Indemnity Claims Against Settling
P R P s .............................................
1. Statutory Construction .......................
2. Legislative History ............................
3. The Cases: "Bona Fide" Indemnity Claims
Can Probably Be Enforced Against a Settling
P R P ..........................................

885

CONCLUSION . .........................................

895

889
889
892
893

* J.D., Boston University School of Law, 1988. The author is a corporate attorney with the firm of Goulston & Storrs, P.C., Boston, MA. The views set forth in
this Article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily represent the views
of Goulston & Storrs, P.C., or any other attorneys thereof. The author would like
to express his appreciation to his wife Michelle, for the support and guidance she
provided while he wrote this and other law review articles.

872

ENVIRONMENTAL INDEMNIFICATION
I.

INTRODUCTION:

873

ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP LIABILITY: THE

"WILD CARD" OF A TRANSACTIONAL COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS

The comprehensive environmental regulations enacted during the past decade have had an enormous impact on the world
in which we live. Regrettably, this well-intended legislation has
probably had a more dramatic effect on the manner in which
business transactions and operations are structured, analyzed
and implemented than on the quality of our natural resources.'
For example, when a business evaluates a major transaction,
such as the acquisition of another business, it must now consider
the possibility that mammoth environmental cleanup costs may
be imposed on any of a number of players involved. In many
business transactions, the parties allocate, among themselves, the
various liabilities and obligations.' A reliable economic analysis
of the true impact of environmental liability, however, is often
impossible to achieve given the number of unpredictable variables involved. Among these variables are the potential enormity
of the cleanup costs, 3 the strict nature of environmental liability,
the relative recency of the environmental statutes and of the enviI Judge Alfred Wolin of the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey recently observed:
At long last we have recognized the frailty created by our shortsightedness and have begun to take steps to reduce the rate of the Earth's
destruction, and to remediate our past transgressions against the
planet. For its part, through the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 . . . Congress has
fashioned a statutory framework intended to motivate individuals to
clean up their own land by providing the incentive that they may recover all costs from other parties to whom the environmental damage
is attributable. Conceived in haste and born out of compromise, that
statute has produced significant litigation over the meaning of even its
most basic terms, and has not, after a decade, produced a fraction of
the results envisioned by Congress.
Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 801 F. Supp. 1309, 1314 (D.N.J.), amended, 801 F.
Supp. 1334 (D.N.J. 1992) (footnote omitted). In 1985, a congressional committee
noted that "[t]o date, only 4 toxic waste sites, according to EPA officials, have been
fully cleaned up. Two others . . . are claimed to have been cleaned up by the EPA.
But recent disclosures about pollutants still present at these sites suggest that the
remedial measures taken may have been inadequate." H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, at 3 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3126.
2 Often, for example, the purchaser and seller of a business will agree upon an
appropriate allocation of specified liabilities, assume their respective liabilities and
each would then normally indemnify the other with respect to the liabilities it
assumed.
3 By 1985, it appeared clear, albeit in hindsight, that solving the "pollution
problem" would prove much more daunting, financially and otherwise, than had
been assumed upon the enactment of the Superfund legislation:
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ronmental enforcement agencies 4 and the sometimes erratic level
of political attention paid to environmental issues. As a result,
financial allocation of environmental liabilities is often the "wild
card" of the business transaction. Indeed, the interplay of legal,
economic and political forces often creates more of an obstacle in
effecting cleanup than do the technical aspects involved in the
Superfund was passed in 1980 to address what many believed was a
relatively limited problem. The EPA was instructed to find 400 hazardous waste sites. Most believed that cleaning up a site was relatively
inexpensive and involved removing containers or scraping a few inches of soil off the ground. The Agency was given $1.6 billion to administer the cleanup of the 400 sites.
• . . Today, five years later, our understanding of the problem
posed by abandoned hazardous chemicals is entirely different ...
[T]here may be as many as 10,000 Superfund sites across the Nation,
or an average of 23 sites per Congressional district .... The total cost
of completing the Superfund program is estimated to be as much as
$100 billion. The total time will be decades.
H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 54-55 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2836-37. Then-President Reagan continued to be concerned
with the costs associated with the Superfund program. When signing the 1986
amendments into law, Reagan stated:
While I approve of the programmatic changes in the Superfund legislation, I have expressed concern in the past regarding the level of
funding and the funding mechanism itself. I am assured by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency that the Agency
will spend only what is necessary to accomplish the objectives of the
program, and no more.
Statement of President Ronald Reagan Upon Signing H.R. 2005, 22 Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents 1412, October 27, 1986, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3441. Only time will tell whether the "revised" 1985 estimates also prove to be
overly optimistic.
4 According to some, in addition to facing the inherent difficulties of enforcing
new (and poorly drafted) federal legislation with inadequate financial resources, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) suffered from mismanagement during its
early years:
Unfortunately, the first few years of the Superfund program were
characterized by delays and mismanagement. An examination of the
Environmental Protection Agency's efforts to carry out the Superfund
law . . . during 1982 and 1983 led to disclosures that the program's
managers had adopted policies more oriented towards conserving
monies in the Fund rather than spending them to clean up the
thousands of abandoned toxic waste dumps around the country.
...[T]he EPA administrator was cited by Congress for contempt
and resigned in March of 1983. Shortly thereafter, approximately 20
other senior agency officials were either fired or resigned.
H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, at 3 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3126. See also H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at
55 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2837 ("To compound the problem
the first administrator of the Superfund program undermined the intent of the program. Under the initial leadership of Assistant Administrator Lavelle, the program
was victimized by gross mismanagement .... ").
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cleanup itself.5
Even if the parties to a business transaction are able to agree
in principle to an appropriate allocation of, and indemnification
for, financial responsibility for environmental cleanup, enforcement of that agreement may prove to be a difficult task. When a
party sues to compel environmental indemnity, the court must
decide as a threshold matter if the indemnity is enforceable
under the environmental statutes. If the court determines that
environmental indemnity is indeed enforceable, it will cast a very
leery and critical eye towards any contractual language that purports to allocate environmental cleanup responsibility.
An interesting additional hurdle is presented when the party
providing environmental indemnity settles its own environmental
liability with the EPA. In general, a settling party has statutory
protection against a contribution suit by a third party, if that suit is
based on a matter addressed in the settlement with the EPA.6
The courts have not determined, however, whether this statutory
protection against contribution claims also encompasses indemnity
7
claims.

If a party is able to avoid existing environmental indemnity
obligations by settling its own environmental liability with the
EPA, the valuation and allocation by private parties of financial
responsibility for environmental cleanup becomes even more difficult because the indemnitee must therefore consider the "risk"
of an indemnitor's settlement with the EPA. On the other hand,
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)8 evinces a clear statutory
preference for responsible parties to settle, once and for all, their
liability for environmental cleanup. The courts have as yet
neither reconciled nor prioritized these divergent interests.
This Article argues that as a matter of statutory construction,
legislative intent and sound public policy, CERCLA does not
prohibit the enforcement of bona fide environmental indemnity
claims-as opposed to and distinct from contribution claimsSee Hatco, 801 F. Supp. at 1314.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), § 113(f)(2), § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).
7 Suits seeking contribution are indeed distinct from suits seeking indemnity.
For a discussion of the difference, see infra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
8 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75, as amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-149, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1982 & Supp. IV 1987)).
5
6
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against an indemnitor that has settled its own liability with the
federal government.
Section II of this Article briefly summarizes the current federal framework of environmental regulation under CERCLA.
The extent to which private parties may allocate financial responsibility for CERCLA liability is examined in Section III. Section
IV discusses the contractual language needed to effect such an
allocation. In Section V, this Article reviews the relatively few
cases that have addressed an indemnitee's ability to pursue an
environmental indemnity claim against a settling indemnitor, and
concludes that the statutory ban on contribution claims against
settling parties does not immunize those settling parties from
bona fide indemnity claims.
II.

THE

CERCLA

ENVIRONMENT: NEW RULES
SOCIAL POLICY

To

FURTHER

The oft-cited beginning of the move towards a national environmental consciousness was the publication, in 1962, of Rachel
Carson's book entitled Silent Spring.9 By the Earth Day celebration in 1970, momentum in favor of comprehensive environmental cleanup had reached the critical level; Congress responded
with a succession of legislative initiatives, which were enacted
throughout the decade and into the 1980s.'
One such statute was CERCLA. While other environmental
statutes may be implicated in connection with the historic activi9 RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). Before this point, "only a relatively
small and arguably elitist minority advocated the political agenda that would later
be supported by the environmental movement." Susan Hedman, Expressive Functions
of Criminal Sanctions in Environmental Law, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 889, 891 (1991)
(footnote omitted).
10 One article described the impetus behind Congressional initiatives as follows:
The tumultuous events of the 1960's created a heightened awareness

of the increasing degradation of the environment. People grew concerned that air was becoming unbreathable and water undrinkable
and that natural resources were being carelessly wasted. At the same

time, there was a growing disenchantment with the ability of the federal government, as represented by administrative agencies, to solve
national problems and specifically to protect and conserve national
environmental resources. People no longer held to the New Deal
dream that the ills of society could be cured by delegating authority to
administrative agencies that would creatively regulate complex social
problems in the public interest.
Walter B. Russell, III & Paul T. Thomas Gregory, Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees in
Environmental Litigation: Citizen Suits and the "Appropriate" Standard, 18 GA. L. REV.
307, 307-08 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
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ties at, and the cleanup of, a particular site, " the relevant analysis
within this Article falls within the statutory parameters of
CERCLA. 12

Subject to very limited defenses,'" CERCLA imposes liability
on a broad range of parties, including past and current owners
and operators of contaminated sites and generators or transporters of hazardous substances.' a The liability of these specified
parties is for removal costs, other response costs consistent with
the National
Contingency Plan (NCP)' 5 or damages to natural
6
resources. 1

Liability under CERCLA is generally joint and several
among responsible parties, 7 except perhaps where the environmental harm is clearly divisible among the responsible parties.' 8
II A list of other primary federal environmental statutes includes: the Resource,
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92, and generally known as
"RCRA"); the Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified
in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387); the Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C.
§ 407; the Solid Waste Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 997 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87); and the Clean Air Amendments of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7642). In addition, many states have enacted their own environmental
cleanup statutes, some similar in scope and structure to CERCLA.
12 Whether or not a party may pursue an indemnity claim under CERCLA
against a responsible party that has settled its own liability with the EPA is to be
determined under CERCLA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 9613. This statutory provision provides certain protections to settling parties. For a discussion of these protections,
see infra Section V.
13 See CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
14 See CERCLA § 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1).
15 The National Contingency Plan includes EPA regulations setting forth "procedures and standards for responding to releases of hazardous substances ......
See CERCLA § 105(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a). Private party response costs not consistent with the national contingency plan may not be recoverable under CERCLA.
See County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1513 (10th Cir. 1991)
("[c]onsistency with the NCP is an element of a private cost recovery claim").
16 See CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
17 See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 & n.l 1 (4th Cir. 1988)
(footnote omitted) (agreeing with abundant caselaw construing CERCLA as embodying a strict liability scheme and citing cases), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989);
Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 799 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir.
1986) (noting that CERCLA imposes strict, but not absolute, liability).
18 The Fourth Circuit explained the distinction as follows:
Under common law rules, when two or more persons act independently to cause a single harm for which there is a reasonable basis of
apportionment according to the contribution of each, each is held liable only for the portion of harm that he causes. .

.

. When such per-

sons cause a single and indivisible harm, however, they are held liable
jointly and severally for the entire harm.
Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171-72 (citations omitted). See also County Line, 933 F.2d at
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In the more typical case of indivisible environmental harm, 19 any
one responsible party alone may be held financially accountable
for the related CERCLA liability. That party's remedy would be,
in turn, to seek contribution from other responsible parties.20
III.

ALLOCATION

BY PRPs OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR CERCLA
LIABILITY

A.

The Majority Rule: PRPs May ContractuallyAllocate CERCLA
Responsibility Among Themselves

The majority rule espoused by federal courts is that CERCLA does not prohibit potentially responsible parties (PRPs)
from contractually allocating, among themselves, the financial responsibility for CERCLA liability. 2 The controlling language is
set forth in section 107(e) of CERCLA 22 as follows:
(1) No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement or conveyance shall be effective to transfer from the
owner or operator of any vessel or facility or from any person
who may be liable for a release or threat of release under this
section, to any other person the liability imposed under this
section. Nothing in this subsection shall bar any agreement to
1515 n. 11 (observing that where the harm is divisible, CERCLA may not impose
joint and several liability).
19 For example, indivisible harm may be found where successive property owners have continued the "dirty" industrial practices of their predecessors, or where
scores of entities transport hazardous wastes to a single dump site.
20 See, e.g., United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 932 F.2d 568, 570-71 n.2 (6th Cir.
1991) ("Joint and several liability may be imposed on a responsible party, even
though its role in creating the hazardous site was small, if the harm is indivisible. It
may then seek contribution from other potential responsible parties ....
").
21 See, e.g., Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Serv., Inc., 959 F.2d 126,
129, rehkg denied and opinion amended and superseded, 973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992);
Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 89 (3d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 837 (1989); Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 801 F.
Supp. 1309 (D.N.J. 1992), amended, 801 F. Supp. 1334 (D.N.J. 1992); Armotek Indus., Inc. v. Freedman, 790 F. Supp. 383, 386-87 (D. Conn. 1992); Ganton Technologies, Inc. v. Quadion Corp., No. 89 C 6869, 1992 WL 71658 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30,
1992); Danella Southwest v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 775 F. Supp. 1227, 1240
(E.D. Mo. 1991); Purolator Prod. Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 124, 129
(W.D.N.Y. 1991); Niecko v. Emro Mktg. Co., 769 F. Supp. 973, 989 (E.D. Mich.
1991); Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345, 355 (D.N.J. 1991);
Rodenbeck v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 742 F. Supp. 1448, 1456 (N.D. Ind. 1990);
Central Illinois Pub. Serv. Co. v. Indus. Oil Tank & Line Cleaning Serv., 730 F.
Supp. 1498, 1507 (W.D. Mo. 1990); Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F.
Supp. 994, 1000, modified in part, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,738 (D.N.J.

1988).
22 CERCLA § 107(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e).
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insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party to such agreement
for any liability under this section.
(2) Nothing in this subchapter, including the provisions
of paragraph (1) of this subsection, shall bar a cause of action
that an owner or operator or any other person subject to liability under this section, or a guarantor, has or would have,
by
23
reason of subrogation or otherwise against any person.
The leading case adopting this rule is Mardan Corp. v. C.G. C.
Music, Ltd.24 In that case, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit articulated that contractual agreements between "responsible parties" regarding the allocation of CERCLA liability only
determine who will bear financial responsibility for cleanup costs,
but have no impact on the underlying statutory liability, which remains unaffected by private agreement. 25 Additionally, the court
stated, regardless of the interpretation of such agreements, the government retains the right to pursue "responsible parties" to recover
26
cleanup or closure costs.
Notwithstanding the general rule allowing contractual allocation of CERCLA responsibility, courts often struggle with the perceived inconsistency between the first sentence of paragraph (1) of
section 107(e), which appears to prohibit transfers of CERCLA liability, and the second sentence of the paragraph, which appears to
27
allow allocations of CERCLA liability.
Many courts adopting the majority rule have reconciled the first
and second sentences of paragraph (1) of section 107(e) by reasoning that although CERCLA allows private parties to allocate the financial responsibility for CERCLA liability among PRPs, such
allocation is only binding between PRPs, and not between PRPs and
the EPA. 2" This approach forbids a PRP from transferring liability
23 Id.
24 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986).
25 Id. at 1459.
26 Id.
27 See,

e.g., Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Kop-Coat, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1022, 1025 (N.D.
Cal. 1990), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials
& Serv., Inc., 959 F.2d 126 (9th Cir.) reh 'g denied and opinion amended and superseded,
973 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1992) ("This inartfully drafted provision seems internally
inconsistent."); Danella Southwest v. Southwestern Bell Tel.. Co., 775 F. Supp.
1227, 1240 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (citing inconsistency of the language); AM Int'l, Inc. v.
Int'l Forging Equip., 743 F. Supp. 525, 528 (N.D. Ohio 1990) ("On its face, this
section is internally inconsistent.").
28 For cases supporting this proposition, see infra note 37. Some of the judicial
decisions that have addressed the threshold issue of whether contractual allocation
of CERCLA liability is in fact allowed under CERCLA do not, however, address the
further issue of whether that allocation would be binding on the EPA. See, e.g.,
Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1573 (E.D. Pa. 1988);
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under CERCLA (consistent with the first sentence of section 107),
but allows that PRP to contract with another party (whether PRP,
insurance carrier, etc.) 29 as to the ultimate financial responsibility
for such liability. 30
B.

The Minority Rule: PRPs May Transfer CERCLA Responsibility,
But Not to Any Other PRP

In contrast to the general rule allowing private allocation of
financial responsibility for CERCLA liability, two recent federal
district court decisions have refused to recognize private contractual allocation of CERCLA liability among PRPs. In AM International, Inc. v. International Forging Equipment,3 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio ruled that in enacting the second sentence of section 107(e), "Congress intended to permit any person to contract with others not already
liable under the Act to provide additionalliability by way of insurance
or indemnity. '"32 In other words, under the AM Internationalreasoning, an indemnity agreement would not be enforceable
against a PRP, but would be enforceable against a party not
otherwise facing CERCLA liability, such as, for example, an in33
surance carrier.
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus. Inc., 669 F. Supp.
1285, 1293 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
29 The lengths to which businesses will go to avoid environmental liability is
reflected in the lengthy, complex and bitterly contested insurance litigation that has
become increasingly commonplace. Corporate policyholders often look to their
comprehensive general liability insurance companies for coverage of environmental cleanup costs. These carriers, to say the least, tend to be rather reluctant to
provide insurance coverage for these costs. See generally Daniel R. Avery, Massachusetts
Follows the Judicial Trend: A Reasoned and ProperApproach to Determine Recovery for
Environmental Cleanup Costs Under Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policies, 24
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 891 (1990).
30 For example, a federal district court recently stated:
In my view, the intent of this section is to allow parties to bring an
action to enforce their contractual rights to indemnification or contribution, notwithstanding the language of § 107(e)(1). Thus, if a party
that is the beneficiary of an indemnity agreement is sued by a CERCLA claimant, that party may seek indemnification from the other
party to the agreement. This language ensures that Section 107(e)(l)
will not be interpreted to abrogate such contractual agreements.
Purolator Prod. Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 124, 130 (W.D.N.Y. 1991)
(citations omitted).
31 743 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
32 Id. at 529 (emphasis added).
33 AM International has provoked pointed criticism. Wholesale adoption of the
approach taken in the case could, according to one commentator, "produce a regulatory and political fiasco comparable to that created by the Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp. regarding lender liability under CERCLA."
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Recently, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Michigan, in CPC International, Inc. v. Aerojet-General
Corp. ,3 adopted the AM Internationalapproach. In so doing, the
court simply stated that "AM Internationalcorrectly names Section
107(e)(1) as a general statement rule forbidding the application
of releases to bar CERCLA liability.""5 The court added that, in
its view, such a result was consistent with both the legislative history of section 107(e)(1) and CERCLA's broad goals of encouraging cleanups and charging those responsible with the
36
attendant costs.

The AM International and CPC Internationaldecisions do not,
however, reflect a trend in judicial interpretation. Relevant cases
decided after the March, 1991 CPC International decision have
consistently adopted the majority rule allowing private allocation
of CERCLA responsibility among PRPs. 7
James W. Conrad, Jr., CERCLA Does Not Invalidate ContractualAllocations of Liability,
22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,045, 10,046 (Jan. 1992).
One compelling criticism of the AM International analysis is that the court, in
effect, derived a meaning from the statute which simply is not evident from its plain
wording. CERCLA § 107(e)(1) nowhere states that the exception to the prohibition against transferring CERCLA responsibility only applies to non-PRPs:
"[n]othing in this subsection shall bar any agreement to insure, hold harmless, or
indemnify a party to such agreement for any liability under this section." CERCLA
§ 107(e)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) (emphasis added). In this regard, theAM International interpretation is contrary to fundamental principles of statutory construction. See generally 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 198 (1974 & 1991 Supp.) (footnote
omitted) ("The general rule is that nothing may be read into a statute which is not
within the manifest intention of the legislature as gathered from the act itself
....
.).
CPC International, the other case adopting the minority approach of disallowing
private allocation of financial responsibility for CERCLA liability, provides no additional argument in support of this position. Indeed, CPC Internationaladopted the
AM Internationalapproach with virtually no analysis. See notes 30-36 and accompanying text (discussing AM Internationaland CPC International).
34 759 F. Supp. 1269 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
35 Id.at 1282.
36 Id. at 1282-83.
37 See, e.g., Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 801 F. Supp. 1309, 1317, amended,
801 F. Supp. 1334 (D.N.J. 1992) ("CERCLA liabilities can be allocated between
parties ....");Armotek Indus., Inc. v. Freedman, 790 F. Supp. 383, 386-87 (D.
Conn. 1992) (footnote omitted) ("By its express terms, Section 107(e)(l) of CERCIA preserves the right of private parties to contractually transfer to or release
another from financial responsibility arising out of CERCLA liability."); Ganton
Technologies, Inc. v. Quadion Corp., No. 89 C 6869, 1992 WL 71658 at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 30, 1992) ("private parties ... retain the freedom to contract out of CERCLA liability"); Danella Southwest, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 775 F. Supp.
1227, 1240 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (CERCLA allows for private allocation of liability);
Purolator Prod. Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 124, 129 (W.D.N.Y. 1991)
(under CERCLA, private parties may "contractually shift responsibility" vis-a-vis
each other); Niecko v. Emro Mktg. Co., 769 F. Supp. 973, 989 (E.D. Mich. 1991)
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MUCH Is ENOUGH? THE LEVEL OF DETAIL NEEDED TO
ALLOCATE CERCLA RESPONSIBILITY

As discussed above, CERCLA does not per se prohibit a PRP
from contractually transferring the financial burden of its CERCLA liability to another party. The parties may transfer financial
responsibility for CERCLA liability, however, only if their contract demonstrates a clear intent to do so."8 The judicial decisions yield a very broad and general set of guidelines that help
demonstrate the level of specificity necessary to transfer CERCLA responsibility. 9
A.

"As Is" Clauses

An "as is" clause, for example where a purchaser agrees to
purchase property "as is," is insufficient to transfer CERCLA responsibility to the purchaser.4" The courts ruling on this issue
often view the "as is" clause as precluding breach of warranty
claims, but not necessarily statutory claims, such as those falling
under CERCLA. 4 1
("[I]nsurance, indemnification, or hold harmless agreements are valid so long as
they do not transfer liability from an owner or operator to a third party."); Mobay
Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 345, 355 (D.N.J. 1991) ("private parties
may contractually transfer to or release another from CERCLA financial
responsibilities").
38 In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 126 B.R. 650, 653 (D. Mass. 1991), aff'd, 954
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992).
39 Before reviewing the level of specificity required, one should note that courts
are not clear on whether state or federal law should be followed when interpreting
indemnity agreements. See PurolatorProd. Corp., 772 F. Supp. at 131 n.3 (commenting on the "unsettled" question of "whether the construction of indemnity agreements in CERCLA should be governed by federal or state law"). Compare Mardan
Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1548 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that
"Congress seems to have expressed an intent to preserve the associated body of
state law under which agreements between private parties would normally be interpreted") with Mobay Corp., 761 F. Supp. at 351 (noting that "CERCLA's legislative
history strongly suggests a congressional directive to federal courts to develop uniform federal rules").
40 See, e.g., Mobay Corp., 761 F. Supp. at 355-56 (observing that "[c]ourts have
agreed that purchases [sic] of a business 'as is' do not absolve a seller from CERCLA liability"); Int'l Clinical Lab., Inc. v. Stevens, 710 F. Supp. 466, 469 (E.D.N.Y.
1989) (stating that an "as is" clause does not necessarily bar CERCLA claims);
Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc. v. JFD Elec. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1229, 1232
(E.D.N.C. 1988) (noting that an "as is" clause "does not shift affirmative obligations of the parties imposed by statute independent of the contract").
41 See Wiegmann v. Rose Int'l Corp., 735 F. Supp. 957, 961 (N.D. Cal. 1990)
(stating that an "as is" clause protects seller from claims of breach of warranty, not
from statutory causes of action). As the United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey observed:
[A]n "as is" provision is merely a warranty disclaimer and as such pre-
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In addition, whether or not the purchaser knew of environmental contamination on the subject property may also be relevant in the "as is" clause analysis. Where a party unknowingly
purchases contaminated property, courts may be all the more resistant to imposing liability on the purchaser merely because the
purchaser signed an agreement containing an "as is" clause.4 2
B. All-Inclusive Language
A very broad transfer or assumption of liability contained in
the language of a sales contract may, however, include the transfer of CERCLA responsibility. Thus, where a purchaser contractually agrees to assume any and all liabilities of any type
whatsoever arising from or in connection with the property transferred, CERCLA responsibility may be passed to the purchaser.
This may be the case even if CERCLA liability is not specifically
identified as falling within the broad category of liabilities
assumed.43
For example, in enforcing a contractual allocation of environmental responsibility among private parties, the Ninth Circuit, in Mardan, construed language in a settlement agreement
relieving the seller from liability for " 'all actions ... based upon,

arising out of or in any way relating to the Purchase AgreeIn the absence of extrinsic evidence demonstrating a
ment.'
contrary intent, the court concluded that such expansive language encompassed CERCLA liability, and accordingly held the
",44

cludes only claims based on breach of warranty. It does not act to shift
liability from one party to an agreement to another and is inapplicable
in a cause of action which is not based on breach of warranty. Therefore, standing alone, the "as is" clause cannot defeat Southland's
CERCLA claims.
Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 1001, modified in part, 19
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,738 (D.N.J. 1988) (citations omitted).
42 Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784, 803
n.20 (1989). See also Wiegmann, 735 F. Supp. at 961 (finding an "as is" clause insufficient to transfer CERCLA liability where purchaser had no knowledge of environmental contamination).
43 See Purolator Prod. Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 124, 135
(W.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that "where the language of an indemnity agreement is
all-inclusive, it must be given effect") (citations omitted); Rodenbeck v. Marathon
Petroleum Co., 742 F. Supp. 1448, 1456 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (concluding that discharge and release from all claims and obligations covered CERCLA liability). See
also United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984
(D.S.C. 1984), aff'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. United States v. Monsanto Co.,
858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
44 Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986).
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buyer responsible.4 5
C.

Specified Non-CERCLA Liability

Language that is not overly broad in scope, and that identifies certain liabilities, which are not "CERCLA-type liabilities," is
often considered insufficient to transfer CERCLA liability between private parties.4 6 One of the more recent relevant decisions on this issue is Armotek Industries, Inc. v. Freedman.4 7 This
case involved a purchase and sale of stock in which the seller provided certain representations and warranties regarding compliance with environmental laws. 4 8 Under the relevant agreement
(entered into prior to the enactment of CERCLA), the purchaser
was entitled to bring indemnity claims relating to these representations and warranties only until October 31, 1982."
In a suit to recover cleanup costs, the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut ruled that the parties had
allocated the risk of environmental compliance to the seller for
the period prior to October 31, 1982, and to the purchaser after
that time, because the purchaser would then be unable to bring
claims for indemnity against the seller regarding environmental
compliance.50 The court found the language of the contract to
be sufficiently precise, stating that the relevant test was whether
the parties' agreement conveyed an intent to allocate "CERCLAtype environmental liability," not whether the text of the agreement explicitly referred to CERCLA. 5 '
Id. at 1461-63.
See Mobay Corp., 761 F. Supp. at 358 (observing that where indemnity was
"typical" and related to ownership and operation of property, language would not
encompass CERCLA liability); Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp.
994, 1001, modified in part, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,738 (D.N.J. 1988)
(positing that an "as is" clause, accompanied by a two year representation and warranty period, and an obligation of seller to remove hazardous waste upon notice
from buyer, not sufficiently specific as to CERCLA liabilities).
47 790 F. Supp. 383 (D. Conn. 1992).
48 Id. at 384.
49 Id. at 384-87.
50 Id. at 392. A flaw in the Armotek court's analysis is that while the agreement,
by its terms, "cuts off" contractual indemnity claims as of the specified date, it does
not necessarily follow that a statutory claim under CERCLA (for example, a private
response cost recovery action or a suit for contribution) would similarly be barred
after that date. One would expect a purchaser in these factual circumstances to
argue that its agreement to abandon claims of indemnity for breach of representation and warranty upon a certain date does not include a release of statutory claims
arising after that date.
51 Id. at 391.
45
46
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A

PRP

In the previous section, this Article discussed private parties'
rights to allocate CERCLA responsibility. In this section, the Article will explore the legitimacy of these agreements when one
PRP decides to settle its liability with the EPA.
A.

The Statutory Settlement Structure

CERCLA is intended to facilitate settlement of cleanup responsibility between PRPs and the EPA,5 2 and to discourage the
53
pursuit of cleanup cost reimbursement through litigation.
While a PRP is not per se obligated to join in a settlement between other PRPs and the EPA, a non-settling PRP faces considerable disadvantages. First and foremost, a non-settling PRP
may be faced with financial exposure disproportionately greater
than the liability originally allocated to that PRP. Upon settlement, the reduction in liability of the non-settling PRPs is tied to
Indeed, CERCLA states in pertinent part:
The President, in his discretion, may enter into an agreement with any
person (including the owner or operator of the facility from which a
release or substantial threat of release emanates, or any other potentially responsible person), to perform any response action . . . if the
President determines that such action will be done properly by such
person. Whenever practicable and in the public interest, as determined by the President, the President shall act to facilitate agreements
under this section that are in the public interest and consistent with
the National Contingency Plan in order to expedite effective remedial
actions and minimize litigation.
CERCLA § 122(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a).
53 See United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 88 (1st Cir. 1990)
(advancing that CERCLA is intended to achieve "prompt settlement and a concomitant head start on response activities"); Central Illinois Pub. Serv. Co. v. Indus. Oil
Tank & Line Cleaning Serv., 730 F. Supp. 1498, 1502 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (commenting that CERCLA "is designed to promote quick action by encouraging settlements
among potentially responsible parties"); Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity
and Guar. Co., 555 N.E.2d 576, 581 (Mass. 1990) (footnote omitted) (explaining
that "the EPA processes for the enforcement of obligations to aid in the cleaning
up of environmental pollution have moved away from the use of lawsuits toward
the use of agency demands for participation in remedial action").
As one federal district court explained:
Cleanup plans embodied in consent decrees possess numerous advantages. Bypassing the time and expense required by litigation is an
obvious plus. Cleanups funded and conducted by potentially responsible parties under a consent decree relieve the government of considerable burdens on its limited resources. Further, negotiated solutions
are born of a desirable cooperation among the parties concerning the
complex technical aspects of the remedial action.
United States v. Bliss, 133 F.R.D. 559, 567-68 (E.D. Mo. 1990).
52
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the amount paid under the settlement, and not to the actual
amount discharged as a result of that settlement (even if the
amount paid is significantly less than the actual liability). 54 Thus,
to the extent that settling PRPs pay less than their allocated share
of liability-which might well be expected in a settlement-CERCLA "apparently compels the non-settlers to absorb the
shortfall." 55 The shifting of responsibility for settlement
shortfall to non-settling PRPs therefore provides a real and
meaningful incentive for PRPs to settle, and creates "a corresponding detriment to their more recalcitrant counterparts. "56
In addition, a non-settling PRP may find it very difficult to
challenge, by judicial means, a settlement between the EPA and
other PRPs, even if the non-settling party is faced with disproportionate liability. In particular, courts have had little patience with
attempts by non-settling PRPs to challenge a settlement that had
been earlier rejected. 57 As the First Circuit stated in Cannons, because a non-settling PRP has "called the tune by [its] refusal to
54 CERCLA provides in relevant part that:

A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State
in an administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement. Such settlement does not discharge any of the other
potentially liable persons unless its terms so provide, but it reduces
the potential liability of the others by the amount of the settlement.
CERCLA § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. 9613(0(2).
55 City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 697 F. Supp. 677, 681 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1988),
aff'd inpart, 932 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1991). See also In re Acushnet River & New
Bedford Harbor: Proceedings Re Alleged PCB Pollution, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1026
(D. Mass. 1989) ("The words of the statute are clear: the potential liability of the
others is reduced 'by the amount of settlement,' not by the settlor's proportionate
share of any damages ultimately determined to have been caused.").
56 Cannons, 899 F.2d at 91. The United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts, discussing the shift in responsibility to non-settling PRPs, observed:
This result is in keeping with Congress' intent to encourage CERCLA
settlements and reduce the time and expense of enforcement litigation that necessarily diverts money from cleanup and restoration.
Were the law otherwise, the responsibility of the settlor for damages
would need to be fully litigated by the sovereigns and the non-settlors
to determine the settlor's proportional share, thus largely duplicating
the aspects-and expense-of the litigation the settlement was
designed to avoid.
In re Acushnet River, 712 F. Supp. at 1027 (footnotes omitted).
57 Sensitive to the statutory preference for prompt settlement and cleanup,
courts give the EPA considerable leeway in developing and finalizing CERCLA settlements. See Cannons, 899 F.2d at 88 ("Because we are confident that Congress
intended EPA to have considerable flexibility in negotiating and structuring settlements, we think reviewing courts should permit the agency to depart from rigid
adherence to formulae wherever the Agency proffers a reasonable good-faith justification for departure.").
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subscribe to the administrative settlement," that PRP "should
have to pay the piper."58 Indeed, some courts have even refused
to recognize a non-settling PRP's standing to challenge a settlement between the EPA and other PRPs,59 notwithstanding CERCLA's intervention provision.60
While contribution suits among PRPs are, as a general matter,
allowed by statutory mandate under CERCLA, 61 a PRP that settles
58 Cannons, 899 F.2d at 89. The court also stated: "SARA's legislative history
makes pellucid that, when such consent decrees are forged, the trial court's review
function is only to 'satisfy itself that the settlement is reasonable, fair and consistent
with the purposes that CERCLA is intended to serve.' " Id. at 85 (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 19 (1985), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3038, 3042).
59 One court explained its refusal to grant a non-settling PRP standing to challenge a settlement between the EPA and other PRPs as follows:
Here, defendants... are unwilling or unable to settle. Yet, they wish
to be able to object to the settlement of other parties. This court will
not allow defendants to frustrate the settlement process simply because there is a possibility that they may bear a disproportionate liability of the cleanup costs.
State of Arizona v. Motorola, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 141, 146 (D. Ariz. 1991). See also
United States v. Mid-State Disposal, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 573, 577 (W.D. Wis. 1990)
("After refusing to reach a settlement, intervenors cannot now claim prejudice because of potential contribution actions against them"); City of New York v. Exxon
Corp., 697 F. Supp. 677, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in part, 932 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir.
1991) ("To the extent that the non-settling parties are disadvantaged in any concrete way by the applicability of section 113(f)(2) to the overall settlement, their
dispute is with Congress.").
60 CERCLA's intervention provision reads:
[A]ny person may intervene as a matter of right when such person
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the person's ability to protect the interest, unless the
President or the State shows that the person's interest is adequately
represented by existing parties.
CERCLA § 113(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(i).
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona, in Arizona v. Motorola, ruled that the non-settling party did not have a legal interest warranting intervention: "The Court, in light of CERCLA's statutory scheme favoring early
settlements and joint and several liability, believes that defendants do not have a
substantial and legally protectable interest. At best, defendants have a remote economic interest that is insufficient to support intervention." Motorola, 139 F.R.D. at
146. Likewise, the court in Mid-State Disposal rejected a non-settling PRP's request
for intervention on a "timeliness" basis, stating:
The interveners' delay in this case would render the negotiations between the original parties a waste of time and delay the implementation of the remedy designed to benefit the public health and safety at
the site. The original litigating parties as well as the public would be
prejudiced. The court finds that the prejudice to the original parties
make the motion to intervene untimely.
Mid-State Disposal, 131 F.R.D. at 576-77.
61 Under CERCLA "[any person may seek contribution from any other person
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its CERCLA liability with the EPA receives considerable statutory
protection against contribution suits brought by other parties.
The relevant statutory provision states in pertinent part: "[a] person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in
an administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be
liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in
62
the settlement.
The SARA legislation in 1986 added these contribution-related provisions, 63 which have been described as a "powerful
tool" of the EPA. 64 The bar to contribution claims against settling parties was intended to encourage settlement and, in turn,
reward settling PRPs with some degree of finality. 65 Settling with
who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title." CERCLA
§ 113(0(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1).
62 CERCLA § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2).
63 One court explained the impetus behind the SARA amendments as follows:
As enacted in 1980, CERCLA made no express provision for contribution actions among parties held jointly and severally liable under
its section 107 liability scheme. As a result, a potentially liable party
under section 107 faced the prospect of being singled out as a defendant in a government or private cost recovery action without any apparent means of fairly apportioning CERCLA costs awarded against it
to other persons liable for these costs under the statute. The courts
responded to the inequity of this situation, and its negative implications for encouraging private parties to undertake voluntary CERCLA
cleanups, by recognizing an implicit federal right to contribution
under CERCLA. Congress ratified these efforts in 1986 by amending
CERCLA section 113 to expressly recognize a right of contribution
under the statute.
County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1515-16 (10th Cir. 1991) (citations
omitted).
64 See, e.g., In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor: Proceedings Re Alleged
PCB Pollution, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1027 (D. Mass. 1989). In Acushnet River, Judge
Young observed:
Congress passed [CERCLA's settlement] provision to encourage
settlement of CERCLA cases. Previously, settlors had no statutory assurance that any settlement that they reached with the EPA would end
their liability in a case because non-settlors might later seek contribution from them. In an attempt to offset this disincentive to settle, the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") adopted a policy of reducing its judgment against non-settlors to the extent necessary to extinguish the settlor's liability to the non-settlors. SARA's contribution
provision eliminates the need for such a policy where the settlement is
"administrative or judicially approved."
Id. at 1026 (citation omitted).
65 United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 92 (1st Cir. 1990). See
also H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 59 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2841 (providing that "[t]hese provisions should encourage
quicker, more equitable settlements, decrease litigation and thus facilitate
cleanups").
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certain PRPs does not preclude the EPA from continuing to pursue non-settling PRPs under CERCLA.6 6 The post-settlement liability of the non-settling PRPs, however, would be reduced by
the amount of the settlement.6 7
In addition to statutory protection from contribution claims,
settling PRPs themselves retain the right to seek contribution
from non-settling PRPs. 61 Thus, if one PRP settles with the EPA
but another PRP does not, the contribution claims of the first
PRP against the second are preserved.
B.

Why PRPs Are Entitled Under CERCLA to Pursue Environmental
Indemnity Claims Against Settling PRPs
1.

Statutory Construction

As indicated above, CERCLA provides that settling PRPs
"shall not be liable for claims for contribution regarding matters
addressed in the settlement." 6 9 The provision does not, by its
terms, protect against claims for indemnity. It is a basic rule of
statutory construction that "the mention of one thing implies the
exclusion of the other." 7 Therefore, if indemnification and contribution are indeed different concepts, then the specific mention
of contribution claims within CERCLA section 113 implies that
claims for indemnification are to be considered excluded from
the same provision.
It may be stated almost without dispute that indemnity and
contribution are separate and distinct legal concepts:
66 CERCLA § 113()(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2) (providing that "[sluch settlement does not discharge any of the other potentially liable persons unless its terms
so provide ...").
67 Id. For further discussion regarding post-settlement liability, see supra notes
54-55 and accompanying text.
68 CERCLA provides in relevant portion:
A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a
State for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the
costs of such action in an administrative or judicially approved settlement may seek contribution from any person who is not a party to a
settlement ...."
CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(3)(B).
69 CERCLA § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).
70 This rule is often expressed as the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. See,
e.g., 73 Am.JUR. 2D Statutes § 211 (1974 & 1991 Supp.). Although the identification

of one specific matter may be a "strong signal" that Congress intended to omit

other similarly specific matters, Dep't of Air Force v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth.,
877 F.2d 1036, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the rule is one of construction, not of law,
and may be "overcome by a strong indication of contrary legislative intent or public
policy." 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23 (1991 ed. & 1992
Supp.).
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There are fundamental distinctions between contribution and
indemnity. Contribution is the right of a person who has been
compelled to pay what another should have paid to require
partial (usually proportionate) reimbursement and arises from
principles of equity and natural justice; indemnity, on the
other hand, arises from contract, express or implied, and is the
right of a person, who has been compelled to pay what an7
other should have paid, to require complete reimbursement. '
Indemnification generally arises either from an express contractual arrangement 72 or by virtue of a special relationship between the
parties. Such special relationships may include that of an employer
and its employee or a principal and its agent. 73 In addition, courts
sometimes recognize claims for "total indemnification," even in the
absence of a contractual arrangement or special relationship, where
the facts warrant one tortfeasor bearing complete financial responsibility for the liability." This "equitable indemnity" or "tort-based
indemnity," however, is not actually indemnity at all, but rather total
71 18 AM. JUR. 2D Contribution § 2 (1985 & 1992 Supp.) (footnotes omitted). See
also Milai v. Tradewind Indus., Inc., 556 F. Supp. 36, 37 (E.D. Mich. 1982) ("Contribution is the method by which a tortfeasor sues a joint tortfeasor for its share of a
joint liability to an injured plaintiff. Indemnity is the device by which a tortfeasor
'passes through' his entire liability to a third party .... ").
72 Liability insurance is one type of indemnification contract. It is quite interesting to observe the radically different manner in which the courts view insurance
contracts and non-insurance contracts when one party to the contract (the policyholder/indemnitee) is seeking indemnity for environmental cleanup costs. As discussed above, in reviewing indemnity provisions in non-insurance contracts, courts
require a significant level of detail within the contractual language to show that the
allocation of the CERCLA liability was, in fact, intended. See supra notes 38-51 and
accompanying text. In these cases, ambiguity or lack of specificity within the relevant provision operates to the detriment of the party seeking indemnity. In the
insurance indemnity context, however, the courts generally construe ambiguities in
the policies in favor of the policyholder seeking indemnity for cleanup costs. For
example, some courts have even ruled that the word "sudden," when used in a
comprehensive general liability contract to describe a release of contaminants, is

"ambiguous," thereby drastically cutting down the scope of the exclusion in which
the word is used. See, e.g., New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
933 F.2d 1162, 1198-99 (3d Cir. 1991); Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
380 S.E.2d 686, 687-88 (Ga. 1990). But see Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host
Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1423, 1429 (D. Kan. 1987), aff'd, 946 F.2d 1482, vacated in part
on reh'g, 946 F.2d 1489 (10th Cir. 1991) ("The language is clear and plain, something only a lawyer's ingenuity could make ambiguous.").
73 See Allied Corp. v. Frola, 730 F. Supp. 626, 639 & n.7 (D.N.J. 1990) (noting
that special relationships may include those between lessor-lessee, union-member,
employer-employee and principal-agent).
74 See Central Illinois Pub. Serv. Co. v. Indus. Oil Tank & Line Cleaning Serv.,
730 F. Supp. 1498, 1506 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (citing authority allowing equitable indemnification in the absence of a contractual or special relationship, but refusing to
impose it in the context of CERCLA).
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75
contribution by one party.
Moreover, some provisions of CERCLA address contribution
by name; others identify indemnification as the subject. 76 This suggests that Congress, in drafting CERCLA, recognized the meaningful distinction between indemnity and contribution. On the other
hand, Congress has also expressed its intent to promote prompt settlement between the EPA and PRPs, and the courts are receptive to
the need to protect settling parties against further liability in connection with the cleanup at issue in the settlement.7 7
While reading the statute in accordance with basic principles of
statutory construction shows that settling PRPs are not immune
from bona fide indemnity claims, the analysis is not complete with78
out a review of the relevant legislative history.
75 See, e.g., United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 92 (1st Cir.
1990) (stating that the noncontractual indemnity claim at issue was simply an extreme form of contribution claim); Drake v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1007,
1011 n.2 (1st Cir. 1985) (same), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1126 (1986).
The Second Circuit, in deciding the effect of a statutory liability limitation
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, described this
type of "equitable indemnity" in a historical context:
Indemnity was [historically] available on a number of grounds.
One, which we may call tort indemnity, was based "merely upon a
difference between the kinds of negligence of the two tortfeasors; as
for instance, if that of the indemnitee is only 'passive,' while that of
the indemnitor is 'active.'" As Judge Learned Hand perceived,
"[s]uch cases may perhaps be accounted for as lenient exceptions to
the doctrine that there can be no contribution between joint
tortfeasors .... When both are liable to the same person for a single
joint wrong, and contribution, strictijuris, is impossible, the temptation is strong if the faults differ greatly in gravity, to throw the whole
loss upon the more guilty of the two."
* . . [Tlhis tort-based form of indemnity was hardly distinguishable from contribution ....
Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714, 718-19 (2d Cir. 1978) (citations
omitted).
76 For example, as discussed in Section III, supra, CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607, addresses the enforceability of indemnification agreements. See also CERCLA § 119, 42 U.S.C. § 9619 (allowing the EPA to indemnify response action
contractors).
77 As one court stated in barring a non-settling party's contribution claim, 42
U.S.C. § 9613(f) "provides the settlors with a statutory signal that any settlement
they reach would end their liability in the case." Allied Corp. v. Frola, 730 F. Supp.
626, 638 (D.N.J. 1990). See also Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Time Oil Co., 738
F. Supp. 1339, 1342 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (commenting that "§ 9613(0(2) encourages parties to settle their CERCLA liability by offering them the promise of fully
extinguishing their alleged liability"). But cf. United States v. Alexander, 771 F.
Supp. 830 (S.D. Tex. 1991) (allowing action against settling party to determine if
that party's contribution was greater than de minimis).
78 Indeed, CERCLA's relevant legislative history should be examined because
the rules of statutory construction should not be applied so as to result in a reading
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Legislative History

Words within a statute should be interpreted in accordance
with their plain meaning.7 9 CERCLA's underlying legislative history confirms that the "plain reading" of the statute is appropriate and correct-that CERCLA does not preclude indemnity
claims against settling parties. The original SARA bill80 stated
that a PRP settling its CERCLA liability pursuant to a court-approved settlement "shall not be liable for claims for contributionor
indemnity regarding matters addressed in the settlement."'"
Later, in October, 1985, the Judiciary Committee adopted
the contribution protection provision of H.R. 2817, but amended
the provision to clarify "that entry into a judicially-approved settlement with the government protects a party only against the
contribution claims of other potentially liable parties, and not
against indemnification claims." '82 TheJudiciary Committee went on
to explain the distinction between contribution and indemnification:
Contribution is a statutory or comon [sic] law right available to
those who have paid more than their equitable share of an entire liability. Indemnity is a right arising from a contract or a
of the statute that is inconsistent with clear legislative intent. See infra note 79 and
accompanying text.
79 E.g., SUTHERLAND, supra note 70, at § 46.01.
80 "A Bill to Amend the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, and for Other Purposes," H.R. REP. 2817, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) ("H.R. 2817"). The final bill, H.R. 2005, replaced, but
incorporated much of, H.R. 2817. See 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835.
81 H.R. 2817, supra note 80, at 40 (emphasis added). A September 1985 report
by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce reflected the inclusion of both
contribution claims and indemnification claims within the original bill, observing
that under these provisions, "[ijf a party has resolved its liability to the U.S. or a
state in a judicially-approved, good-faith settlement, the party would not be liable
for claims for contribution or indennity on matters addressed in the settlement." H.R.
REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 59 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2841 (emphasis added). See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 5, at 24 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3147 (a settling party
"is not to be liable for claims for contribution or indemnity regarding matters addressed in the settlement"); H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 80
(1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2862 ("The section contemplates that
if an action under section 106 or 107 of the Act is under way, any related claims for
contribution or indemnification may not be brought in such an action."); H.R. REP.
No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 79 (1985), 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861
("The section also confirms a Federal right of contribution or indemnification for
persons alleged or held to be liable under section 106 or 107 of CERCLA and
prohibits the assertion of such rights against a party who has entered into a judicially approved settlement with EPA.").
82 H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 19 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3042 (emphasis added).
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special relationship between parties. Settlement with the government under CERCLA should not abrogate independently
existing rights of persons to indemnity.8"
The resulting statutory language, adopted by Congress and
signed into law by the President, reflects the Judiciary Committee's
well-founded and intentional exclusion of indemnity claims from a
settling party's "contribution protection." The legislative history
confirms a plain reading of the statute to this effect.
3.

The Cases: "Bona Fide" Indemnity Claims Can
Probably Be Enforced Against a Settling PRP

Direct case law on whether CERCLA's contribution protection encompasses contractual indemnity claims is scant. The
cases, however, appear to confirm, or at least predict the likely
judicial acceptance of, the position that CERCLA's contribution
protection provisions do not bar bona fide indemnity claims. 84
In certain cases, plaintiffs barred by section 113 from pursuing contribution claims against settling PRPs have sought to recast their claims as arising from equitable, as opposed to
contractual or special relationship, indemnity. 8 5 Not surprisingly, courts have been loathe to allow this type of "end-run"
around CERCLA's contribution protection provisions.8 6 While
these cases address claims of equitable indemnity,8 7 they often
provide guidance as to how a court might rule with respect to
contractual or other bona fide indemnity claims.8 8
The First Circuit, for example, in United States v. Cannons Engineering Corp. 89 rejected indemnity claims against certain settling
parties where the complaining parties had not alleged any contractual basis for indemnification. 90 Instead, the court construed the
Id.
See infra notes 85-102 and accompanying text (discussing cases).
See, e.g., Drake v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 772 F.2d 1007, 1011 n.2 (1st Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1126 (1986); Zapico v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 579 F.2d 714,
718-19 (2d Cir. 1978); Central Illinois Pub. Serv. Co. v. Indus. Oil Tank & Line
Cleaning Serv., 730 F. Supp. 1498, 1506 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
86 See United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 92 (1st Cir. 1990)
(refusing to impose a right of indemnification in contravention of § 9613(0 (2) so as
not to allow "non-settlors to make an end run around the statutory scheme").
87 Equitable indemnity claims have been held to be tantamount to claims for
"total" contribution. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (explaining the
construction of equitable indemnity claims).
88 See infra notes 89-102 and accompanying text (discussing cases that suggest
the probable resolution of contractual or other bona fide indemnity claims).
89 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990).
83
84
85

90 Id. at 92.
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noncontractual indemnity claim as "a more extreme form" of
contribution claim. 9 1 Noting that claims for partial contribution
could be precluded in the context of a CERCLA settlement, the
court stated that the claims for total contribution-indemnitycould likewise be barred.9 2 The Cannons court did not explicitly
hold, however, that a bona fide indemnity claim based on a valid
contract between PRPs would be foreclosed.
Similarly, the court in CentralIllinois Public Service Co. v. Industrial Oil Tank & Line Cleaning Service9" distinguished between con-

tractual and noncontractual rights of indemnity under section
113(f) of CERCLA. 94 In so doing, the court ruled that section
113(f) would bar claims of equitable indemnity because to construe otherwise would contravene CERCLA's contribution protection provisions. 95 At the same time, however, the court
recognized that CERCLA does permit the enforcement of an indemnity agreement.96
In United States v. Pretty Products, Inc. ,97 the court barred a
claim for indemnity against a settling party, holding that the indemnity claim was, in actuality, a claim for contribution.9" In so
doing, the court stated that in the absence of an indemnity agreement,

the claim was simply an equitable claim for total contribution that
was preempted by CERCLA. 99 Note, however, that notwithstanding its distinction between contractual and equitable indemnity, the court stated that it would be skeptical of any contractual
endeavor intended to contravene CERCLA's provisions on con00
tribution immunity.'
A 1990 federal district court case comes closest to explicitly
stating that contractual indemnity claims against settling parties
are not barred by the CERCLA contribution protection provisions. In Allied Corp. v. Frola,'0 1 the United States District Court
for the District of NewJersey espoused: "[a]lthough it does foreclose most contribution claims, CERCLA does not restrict the right to
91 Id. (quoting Drake v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1007, 1011 n.2 (1st Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1126 (1986)).
92 Id. at 92-93.
93 730 F. Supp. 1498 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
94 Id. at 1506.
95 Id. at 1507.
96 Id.
97 780 F. Supp.
98 Id. at 1495.
99 Id.

at

1488 (S.D. Ohio 1991).

1495-96.

100 Id. at 1496 n.7.
101 730 F. Supp. 626 (D.N.J. 1990).
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0 2
common law indemnification."'1
Taken together, the few relevant
decisions would appear to be consistent with the statutory and
legislative analysis provided above. Given the plain meaning of
the statute and the underlying legislative history, it would be inappropriate, and indeed wrong, for a court to preclude, based on
section 113 of CERCLA, bona fide indemnity claims against a
settling party.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The American people benefit when the EPA is able to settle
cleanup liability with PRPs quickly and efficiently, instead of relying on litigation to compel reimbursement for cleanup costs previously incurred. Our endangered national resources are thereby
provided protection, and our limited financial resources are
maximized.
In turn, the statutory immunity from contribution suits provides an important incentive to a PRP to settle. This immunity
gives the PRP the comfort of knowing that it no longer faces the
prospect of being "tagged" with environmental liability for which
it has not previously bargained. As a result, the PRP can obtain a
reasonably quantifiable level of finality with respect to the
cleanup costs at issue.
If the settling party has agreed with another party to assume
financial responsibility for, and provide indemnity against, environmental liabilities, the settlement with the EPA should not extinguish the settling party's liability to the indemnitee. The
potential indemnification claim would not hamper the cleanup
because the claim, if disputed, could be litigated without direct
impact on either the EPA or the settlement. The settling party's
"level of finality" would not be diminished because the settling
party-and in many cases the EPA-would, of course, already
know of its obligations to the other party. In addition, at least in
theory, the settling party would have negotiated and bargained
for, and received consideration in exchange for, the indemnification provided. Contribution claims, on the other hand, are not
normally bargained for, but rather arise out of tortious or other
wrongful conduct for which joint and several liability is imposed.
By forbidding the indemnitee from pursuing the indemnity
claim, the indemnitee would lose a real and valuable asset for
102 Id. at 639 (emphasis added). In its decision, the court did not allow the claims
for indemnity, given that there was neither an indemnity agreement nor a "special
legal relationship" under New Jersey law. Id.
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which it had bargained and given something in exchange. Not
only would the indemnitee be unjustly punished, but the settling
party would unjustly benefit.
There are valid legal and public policy reasons for treating
contribution claims in a different manner than indemnification
claims. CERCLA's clear language, as well as the congressional
intent underlying it, correctly adopt this distinction.

